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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case. 
Defendant-Respondent Wells Fargo Financial, Inc. made a loan to Plaintiff-Appellant 
William S. Shapley and his wife, Barbara Shapley. When the loan closed, the Shapleys 
submitted, through Wells Fargo, an application for a joint credit life insurance policy from 
Defendant-Respondent Centurion Life Insurance Company. The policy for which the Shapleys 
applied, if issued, would have provided a benefit payable toward the balance of the loan in the 
event one of them died during the policy period. The application papers repeatedly noted that a 
certificate of insurance would be issued if the application were approved. In other words, 
insurance was not automatically issued because an application was submitted; Centurion 
expressly reserved the right to evaluate the proposed insurance risk before underwriting it. 
Mrs. Shapley suffered a brain hemorrhage one day after the Shapleys' application was 
submitted. She passed away a few days later. Centurion had not acted on the application by that 
time, as it quite understandably had not been able to complete its risk evaluation in so little time. 
Consequently, a credit life insurance policy for Mrs. Shapley could not be approved and was 
never issued. When Mr. Shapley made a claim on a nonexistent policy, Centurion was within its 
rights to deny it. 
Mrs. Shapley's death and its timing are undeniably tragic. This is simply a sad situation. 
Nevertheless, neither Wells Fargo nor Centurion is to blame for the fact that, by the time Mrs. 
Shapley fell ill and passed away, Centurion had not had an opportunity to evaluate proposed 
insurance risk so that it might agree to underwrite it. 
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B. Course Of Proceedings. 
Mr. Shapley filed this action in June 2010. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 5-11.) The amended 
complaint he filed in August 2010 is his operative pleading. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 12-21.) It includes 
four claims that are at issue on appeal.1 The first of those claims is that Centurion and Wells 
Pargo made, and breached, a contract with him to insure Mrs. Shapley's life. (R. Vol. 1, p. 16.) 
Second is a claim for bad faith in the handling and payment of Mr. Shapley's claim for benefits 
under that alleged insurance contract. (ld.) Third, Mr. Shapley claims Centurion and Wells 
Pargo were negligent in procuring or issuing insurance on Mrs. Shapley's life. (R. Vol. 1, p. 17.) 
His final claim is that the failure to pay his insurance claim constitutes intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. (Jd.) 
Centurion and Wells Fargo moved for summary judgment in July 2011. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 
207-34.) They argued that all four of the claims at issue depended on the existence of a contract 
to insure Ms. Shapley's life, but no such contract was ever made since Mrs. Shapley fell ill and 
passed away almost immediately after the Shapleys' application for joint credit life insurance 
was submitted-and before Centurion had an opportunity to evaluate and accept or decline the 
proposed insurance risk. CR. Vol. 2, pp. 227-28.) 
In November 2011, the district court granted summary judgment to Centurion and Wells 
Fargo, agreeing that all of Mr. Shapley's claims depended on the existence of contract to insure 
Mrs. Shapley's life and that no such contract was ever made. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 277-83.) 
1 Mr. Shapley also made a fifth claim, for fraud, but later consented to summary judgment 
against it. (R. Vol. 2, p. 264.) His fraud claim is not at issue on appeal. 
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Later that month, Mr. Shapley filed a motion to amend his complaint to add an estoppel 
claim. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 285- 301.) On November 29,2011, while that motion was pending, the 
district court entered a final judgment in favor of Centurion and Wells Fargo. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 
302-04.) The entry of final judgment prompted Mr. Shapley to seek reconsideration of the 
district court's summary-judgment ruling. He took that step on December 9, 2011. (R. Vol. 2, 
pp.305-22.) In doing so, Mr. Shapley argued for the first time that his negligence claim does not 
depend on the existence of a contract to insure Mrs. Shapley's life. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 318-20.) Mr. 
Shapley's new argument prompted Centurion and Wells Fargo to contend, in opposing 
reconsideration, that the negligence claim is barred by the "economic loss rule" even if not 
dependent on a contract to insure Mrs. Shapley's life. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 336-38.) 
On February 22,2012, the district court entered an order d~nying Mr. Shapley's motions. 
(R. Vol. 2, pp. 355-63.) The district court disallowed the proposed estoppel claim, deeming it 
futile. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 357-58.) In addition, the district court adhered to its ruling that no contract 
was made to insure Mrs. Shapley's life, and it agreed with Centurion and Wells Fargo that the 
economic loss rule barred Mr. Shapley's negligence claim in any event. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 359-62.) 
Mr. Shapley filed a timely notice of appeal on March 20,2012. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 364-69.) 
C. Statement Of Facts. 
In June 2008, the Shapleys began working with Wells Fargo employee Steve Ellison on 
obtaining a real-estate loan. (R. Vol. 1, p. 172.) On July 10,2008, their loan closed. (Jd.) That 
same day, they prepared an application for a joint credit life insurance policy, using application 
papers received from Ellison. (!d.; R. Vol. 1, pp. 110-15; R. Vol. 2, p. 211.) 
- 3 -
03893.0265.5327612.2 
Several aspects of the application papers are noteworthy (some of them for 
unambiguously dispelling any notion that insurance on Mrs. Shapley's life was automatically in 
force upon application): 
• The application papers informed the Shapleys that Wells Pargo (and, by 
extension, Ellison) "is not acting as a broker to you but as an agent for the 
insurance company [Centurion]." (R. Vol. 1, p. 115.) 
• The application papers did not require an up-front premium payment. If the 
Shapleys' application were approved, the premium would be charged to their loan 
account each month and come due with their monthly loan payments (R. Vol. 1, 
pp. 110,115), starting August 15,2008. (R. Vol. 1, p. 110; R. Vol. 2, p. 282.) 
• In at least five places, the application papers stated that the Shapleys would 
receive insurance only if Centurion approved their application: 
1. "If this Application is approved, a Certificate of Insurance will be issued to 
you." (R. Vol. 1, p. 110.) 
2. "If my (our) application is approved, I (we) will be sent a certificate of 
insurance in approximately 30 days." (R. Vol. 1, p. 112.) 
3. "It is important that you read the Application. If approved, the Certificate you 
will receive explains the coverage you requested in greater detail .... " 
(R. Vol. 1, p. 114.) 
4. "I understand that if my application for insurance is not approved by the 
insurance company, one or both of the coverages for which I have applied will 
not become effective and no charge will be made for that type of insurance." 
(R. Vol. 1, p. 115.) 
5. "Your application will be forwarded to our underwriting department to decide 
if we will approve the insurance coverage(s) you requested." (R. Vol. 2, p. 
211.) 
• The application papers informed the Shapleys that Centurion "require[s] evidence 
of insurability." (R. Vol. 1, p. 111.) To that end, Centurion may require a 
telephone interview of the Shapleys, and "[ilf the interview is not completed for 
any reason we will not approve the insurance coverage(s) you requested." 
(R. Vol. 1, p. 211 (emphasis added).) 
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As part of evaluating the insurance risk presented by a credit life insurance application, 
Centurion decides whether to interview the applicant. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 126-28.) Centurion's 
underwriting guidelines dictated a decision to interview the Shapleys, as they require 
interviewing all applicants at least fifty-five years of age. (R. Vol. 2, p. 213.) Both of the 
Shapleys were more than fifty-five years of age. (R. Vol. 1, p. 112.) Telephone interviews 
therefore were required. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 127-28; R. Vol. 2, p. 213.) Of course, interviews 
necessarily are conducted post-application. While the process is not lengthy, it does take a 
reasonable amount of time. In fact, it "usually took a couple days ... for us [Centurion] to start 
our underwriting process." (R. VoL 2, p. 215.) 
Centurion never had the chance to interview Mrs. Shapley. On July 11, 2008-one day 
after the Shapleys closed their loan and made their insurance application-she suffered a brain 
hemorrhage. (R. Vol. 1, p. 172.) She passed away on July 15, 2008. (R. Vol. 1, p. 173.) 
Mr. Shapley contacted Centurion that very day to claim benefits in connection with Mrs. 
Shapley's passing. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 128, 173.) Centurion denied the claim because it never issued 
insurance on Mrs. Shapley's life, having had no opportunity to interview her before she fell ill 
and passed away_ (R. Vol. 1, pp. 128, 142.) Centurion did, however, interview Mr. Shapley, 
with the result that Centurion approved his application and issued insurance on his life only. 
(R. Vol. 1, pp. 127-28, 137-40, 142.) Mr. Shapley was free to decline that coverage, if 




ADDITIONAL ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
In Section HI(D) of this brief, Centurion and Wells Fargo contend Mr. Shapley waived 
the right to appellate review of his negligence claim's disposition because his opening brief fails 
to challenge the district court's alternative basis for entering summary judgment against that 
claim: the "economic loss rule." Should this Court nevertheless review the merits of that 
claim's disposition, Centurion and Wells Fargo ask this Court to consider, as an additional issue 
on appeal, whether the economic loss rule bars it. 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Standard Of Review. 
This Court's standard of review is the same legal standard the district court was required 
to apply in deciding whether to grant summary judgment. See, e.g., Chandler v. Hayden, 147 
Idaho 765, 768, 215 P.3d 485,488 (2009). Under that standard, the moving parties bear the 
burden of proving-in the first instance-that no genuine issue of material fact exists. [d. at 769, 
215 P.3d at 489. The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to show that a genuine issue of 
material fact exists after all. [d. To satisfy that ultimate burden, the non-moving party "may not 
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial." [d. (quoting LR.C.P. 56(e)). This requires more than "a mere scintilla of evidence" 
that creates only "slight doubtas to the facts." Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552, 556, 
212 P.3d 982, 986 (2009). 
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B. The District Court Correctly Entered Summary Judgment Against Mr. Shapley's 
Claim For Breach Of Contract. 
Mr. Shapley's lead claim is that Centurion and Wells Fargo made, and breached, a 
contract to insure Mrs. Shapley's life. (R. Vol. 1, p. 16.) The district court entered summary 
judgment against that claim, holding that no such contract was ever made, as Centurion did not 
have an opportunity to evaluate the proposed insurance risk and accept Mrs. Shapley as an 
insured before she was incapacitated by a brain hemorrhage. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 283, 359-60.) That 
holding finds ample support in the credit life insurance application papers presented to and 
submitted by the Shapleys, which state in at least five places the Shapleys would receive 
insurance only if Centurion approved their application. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 110,112,114,115; R. 
Vol. 2, p. 211.) Centurion did not approve the Shapleys' joint application. (R. Vol. 1, p. 142.) 
Consequently, the record simply does support Mr. Shapley's argument that a contract was made 
to insure Mrs. Shapley's life. 
1. This Court has seen a claim like Mr. Shapley's before, and, in a squarely 
controlling case, it rejected that claim for lack of an offer and acceptance. 
All evidence to the contrary, Mr. Shapley still insists on appeal that a contract was made 
to insure Mrs. Shapley's life. His argument, however, is foreclosed by Rouse v. Household 
Finance Corp., 144 Idaho 68, 156 P.3d 569 (2007), a controlling case that apparently went 
unnoticed while this action was pending in district court. 
There, the Rouses applied for credit life insurance the same day they received a loan from 
Household Finance Corporation. Id. at 69, 156 P.3d at 570. About six weeks later, after the 
Rouses had made their first loan and premium payment, their application was rejected because of 
Mr. Rouse's past history of kidney cancer, and their first premium payment was refunded. Id. 
- 7 -
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Mr. Rouse did not disclose his bout with kidney cancer on the application, but Household Life 
Insurance Company obtained that information from him in its ensuing evaluation of the proposed 
insurance risk. Id. at 69 n. 1, 156 P.3d at 570 n. 1. About another six weeks after the Rouses' 
application was rejected, Mr. Rouse was diagnosed with terminal brain cancer. Id. at 69,156 
P .3d at 570. The Rouses sued Household Finance and Household Life, claiming to have made a 
contract for credit life insurance, despite that their application had been rejected. Id. The district 
court entered summary judgment against that claim, and this Court affirmed, holding that no 
contract had been made because the application was never accepted: 
Here, there is simply no evidence that there was a meeting 
of the minds. The language of the applications the Rouses signed 
at closing makes clear that the applications mayor may not be 
approved. These applications were titled "Notice of Proposed 
Group Disability Insurance" and "Notice of Proposed Group Life 
Insurance." They both provided that if the application was 
approved, the effective date would be the date of application, that 
if the application was not approved "any premium ... paid will be 
refunded ... or credited to your account," and that the insurance 
benefits summarized on the application "will only apply if your 
application for insurance is approved." Likewise, the Optional 
Credit Insurance Disclosure attached to the refinancing agreement 
provided: "there will be no insurance until the insurer has 
approved your application (if one is required) .... " The Rouses 
were later sent a letter indicating that their applications had been 
denied and received a refund of their premiums. 
The Rouses fail to provide evidence of acceptance. In 
opposition to [the defendants'] motion for summary judgment, the 
Rouses offered a single citation to the entire deposition of Rose 
Rouse. However, a review of that entire deposition fails to reveal a 
single instance of Rose testifying that an agent of [the defendants] 
told the Rouses their application had been approved .... 
- 8-
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[B]ecause there is no evidence of a meeting of the minds between 
the Rouses and [the defendants], no insurance contract was 
formed. 
[d. at 70-71,156 P.3d at 571-72 (emphasis added). 
Here, as in Rouse, no contract was made to insure Mrs. Shapley's life because the 
application was not approved. (R. Vol. 1, p. 142.) Consequently, the district court's grant of 
summary judgment against Mr. Shapley's claim for breach of contract was correct and can be 
affirmed, without need to consider Mr. Shapley's remaining arguments. Rouse, 144 Idaho at 71, 
156 P.3d at 572 ("[S]ince there are no facts indicating that a contract was formed, we need not 
reach the Rouses' remaining arguments on their contract claim."). 
Nevertheless, to be cautious, Centurion and Wells Fargo will proceed to explain why 
none of Mr. Shapley's other arguments has merit. Each one is a variation on a flatly wrong 
theme: that a contract to insure Mrs. Shapley's life can be imposed on Centurion, despite its 
rejection of her application, because Idaho law supposedly denied Centurion the right to evaluate 
insurance risk before at least provisionally accepting Mrs. Shapley as an insured. 
2. Credit life insurance does not automatically take effect upon application; 
instead, if the application is approved after the insured's loan closes, the 
resulting insurance contract is retroactive to the closing. 
"The term of any credit life insurance ... shall, subject to acceptance by the insurer, 
commence on the date when the debtor becomes obligated to the creditor .... " Idaho Code 
§ 41-2307 (emphasis added). Mr. Shapley argues that section 41-2307 results in a contract to 
insure Mrs. Shapley's life, given its requirement that a credit life insurance policy's term must 
commence as of the associated loan's closing. (Appellant's Opening Br. at 13.) That argument, 
however, negates the underscored portion of the statute. As that language makes clear, section 
- 9-
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41-2307 addresses when a contract for credit life insurance commences, not whether such a 
contract was made in the first place. 
Idaho Code § 41-2308 reinforces that point, despite Mr. Shapley's mistaken belief that it 
lends support to his argument. (Appellant's Opening Br. at 13.) He relies on the following 
provision: "[t]he individual policy ... shall be delivered to the insured debtor at the time the 
indebtedness is incurred except as hereinafter provided." Idaho Code § 41-2308(3). The 
underscored language denotes that, by reading the rest of the statute, one will find an exception 
to the rule requiring policy delivery at the time the indebtedness is incurred. Sure enough, 
section 41-2308 goes on to state an exception: a policy need not be delivered when the loan 
closes if the proposed insured "makes a separate payment for credit life or credit disability 
insurance." Idaho Code § 41-2308(4). The Shapleys' payment of the joint credit life insurance 
premium would have been separate from their payment for amounts owed on the loan. Indeed, 
the application papers specified a separate monthly premium amount, which would be collected 
along with the Shapleys' regular monthly loan payment, but which they could avoid anytime 
simply by deciding they no longer wanted the insurance. (R. Vol. 1, p. 115.) 
Since the premium payments were to be separate from the loan payments, the Shapleys 
were entitled to receive, when their loan closed, only "a copy of the application for such policy 
or a notice of proposed insurance." Idaho Code § 41-2308(4). Tellingly, that document "shall 
set forth ... a statement that within thirty (30) days, if the insurance is accepted by the insurer, 
there will be delivered to the debtor an individual policy." Id. (emphasis added). Delivery of an 
actual policy is required only "[ u ]pon acceptance of the insurance by the insurer," which is to 
happen, if at all, "within thirty (30) days of the date upon which the indebtedness is incurred." 
- 10-
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[d. In the event of acceptance, "the insurance shall become effective as provided in section 41-
2307"- in other words, as of the closing of the loan. [d. 
Thus, sections 41-2307 and 41-2308 make clear that credit life insurance does not, as Mr. 
Shapley suggests, take effect automatically upon application. Instead, the insurer has thirty days 
to determine whether to accept the proposed insurance risk. If the insurer accepts the risk, then 
the resulting policy is given retroactive effect, to the date the insured's loan closed. To the 
extent Mr. Shapley argues that sections 41-2307 and 41-2308 are "meaningless" if applied as 
written (Appellant's Opening Br. at 16), he is simply wrong. And, to the extent he argues that 
applying them as written is inappropriate because it produces an "absurd" result (id. at 16,22), 
he is wrong that it is absurd to give insurers thirty days to evaluate insurance risk rather than bind 
them immediately upon application,2 and he is wrong that an unambiguous statute can be 
ignored or judicially modified on the theory that it produces absurd results. Verska v. Saint 
Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Cfr., 151 Idaho 889, 896,265 P.3d 502,509 (2011) ("[W]e have never 
revised or voided an unambiguous statute on the ground that it is patently absurd or would 
produce absurd results when construed as written, and we do not have the authority to do so."). 
2 The absurdity, according to Mr. Shapley, lies in the statutory scheme's potential to give 
insurers what he calls "uneamed premium." (Appellant'S Opening Br. at 22.) The "unearned 
premium" is the premium attributable to the short period between the date the insured's loan 
closes and the date the insurer acts on the application. (ld.) If the applicant dies during that 
period, the insurer is likely to reject the application and avoid a covered loss. If the applicant 
survives and the insurer approves the application, the insurer will collect a premium for 
coverage that by law is retroactive to the application date, knowing that no covered loss 
occurred between the application date and the approval date. The Idaho legislature rationally 
could prefer the scheme it adopted to the different one suggested by Mr. Shapley-but not 
legislatively adopted-in which insurers are bound immediately upon application, subject to 
a right to terminate coverage if the application is rejected. 
- 11 -
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3. Idaho's credit life insurance regulations do not prohibit applicant interviews 
and do not make it unlawful for Centurion to have declined to insure Mrs. 
Shapley's life as a result of her inability to participate in an interview. 
When an applicant for credit life insurance is at least fifty-five years of age, Centurion's 
underwriting guidelines dictate interviewing the applicant as part of deciding whether to 
undertake the proposed insurance risk. (R. Vol. 2, p. 213.) Mrs. Shapley exceeded age fifty-five 
(R. Vol. 1, p. 112), so an interview was essential. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 127-28; R. Vol. 2, p. 213.) The 
application papers informed the Shapleys that Centurion might require a telephone interview. 
(R. Vol. 1, p. 211.) Moreover, they informed the Shapleys that credit life insurance would not be 
made available to them if they did not participate in a required interview: "[i]f the interview is 
not completed for any reason we will not approve the insurance coverage(s) you requested." 
(Jd.) Mrs. Shapley's inability to participate in an interview was the reason Centurion could not 
complete the risk evaluation necessary to issuing insurance on her life. (R. Vol. 1, p. 128.) 
Mr. Shapley argues that Mrs. Shapley's inability to participate in an interview is an 
improper basis for declining to issue insurance on her life. (Appellant's Opening Br. at 13-16.) 
In that regard, he relies on the following Idaho Department of Insurance credit life insurance 
regulation: "[n]o statement made by a debtor shall be used by the insurer as a basis for denying 
eligibility for coverage unless such statement is contained in a written application for insurance 
signed by the debtor." IDAPA 18.01.61.11.14. Mr. Shapley reads too much into that regulation. 
He says it flatly limits the insurer's risk evaluation to reading the insured's application papers. 
(Appellant's Opening Br. at 14.) Consequently, he seems to think it makes interviewing 
applicants an "illegal underwriting inquiry." (ld. at 15.) 
- 12 -
03893.0265.5327612.2 
The regulation has neither of those effects. It does not bar insurers from investigating 
insurability in other ways than merely reading the insured's application papers, and it does not 
prohibit them from conducting applicant interviews. As the district court correctly held, 
although the regulation bars using interview statements themselves as the basis for declining to 
issue credit life insurance, interview statements can raise concerns that warrant investigation and 
ultimately result in a proper basis for declining to issue credit life insurance. (R. Vol. 2, p. 283.) 
To the extent Mr. Shapley is arguing that this interpretation of the regulation renders 
meaningless the clear statutory language on acceptance of credit life insurance applications 
(Appellant's Opening Br. at 16), he is simply wrong. 
4. The "conditional receipt" or "temporary insurance" doctrine does not apply 
because no premium was collected from the Shapleys. 
Mr. Shapley next argues that the "conditional receipt" or "temporary insurance" doctrine 
provides a basis for imposing an insurance contract, despite that none was ever made. He 
describes that doctrine as follows: "an insurer may bind a kind of temporary coverage J2y 
acceptance of a premium that is conditioned upon actual acceptance [of the insurance risk] later 
- after insurability has been determined." (Appellant's Opening Br. at 17 (emphasis added); 
see also id. at 19-21.) In other words, the idea, even according to Mr. Shapley, is that an 
insurer's receipt of a premium at the time of application, subject to its subsequent evaluation and 
acceptance of the insurance risk, effectuates temporary insurance coverage, placing the risk of 
loss on the insurer during the evaluation period. He seemingly proposes extending the doctrine 
so that it applies regardless of an up-front premium payment, so long as the applicant reasonably 
believed insurance took effect upon application. (Id. at 20-21.) 
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Mr. Shapley relies on Toevs v. Western Farm Bureau Life Insurance Co., 94 Idaho 151, 
483 P.2d 682 (1971). There, upon taking an application from Mr. and Mrs. Toevs for term life 
insurance, the insurance agent gave them a "Conditional Premium Receipt," stating that they had 
made the first premium payment to the agent. Id. at 152, 483 P.2d at 683. Two weeks later, 
before the insurer had acted on the application, Mr. Toevs died in a gun accident. !d. This Court 
held that the Conditional Premium Receipt (on its own or in c9mbination with other factors-the 
decision is unclear) resulted in "a temporary contract of insurance." !d. at 155, 483 P.2d at 686. 
The insurer could terminate the contract by rejecting the application, but its failure to do so 
before Mr. Toevs' death meant that insurance was in force when he died. Id. 
The problem with Mr. Shapley's argument is that the Shapleys did not receive a 
conditional premium receipt, as they did not pay any up-front premium. Instead, had the 
Shapleys' application been approved, the premium would have been charged to their loan 
account each month and come due with their monthly loan payments (R. Vol. 1, pp. 110, 115), 
starting more than a month after the application date. (R. VoL 1, p. 110; R. Vol. 2, p. 282.) That 
is a fundamental distinction between this situation and Toevs. In fact, in 2001 this Court was 
presented with a situation more similar to this one, and distinguished Toevs on that basis: 
The conditions that led the Court to adopt the doctrine of 
temporary insurance in Toevs, however, are not found in the 
McGilvrays' case. There was no delivery of a conditional 
premium receipt to the McGilvrays at the time the application for 
insurance was completed. The payments that were to be applied to 
the insurance premiums were only made subsequent to the date the 
application was signed and had yet to be processed .... 
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McGilvray v. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co., 136 Idaho 39,43,28 P.3d 380,384 (2001) 
(holding, ultimately, that no contract for temporary insurance was formed because the 
application was incomplete). 
The district court declined to extend the "conditional receipt" or "temporary insurance" 
doctrine to a situation in which no up-front premium was charged. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 281-83,360.)· 
In doing so, the district court faithfully applied Idaho law. This Court likewise should decline to 
broaden that doctrine at Mr. Shapley's request. Indeed, even if the Court were to broaden it as 
Mr. Shapley requests-so as to apply whenever the applicant reasonably believes insurance was 
in force upon application-it would not help Mr. Shapley. The Shapleys could not possibly have 
reasonably believed insurance was in force upon application, given (among other things) the five 
different statements in the application papers that insurance would be issued only if the 
application were approved. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 110, 112, 114, 115~ R. Vol. 2, p. 211.) 
No contract was made to insure Mrs. Shapley's life, and none is imposed by Idaho law, 
whether under the "conditional receipt" or "temporary insurance" doctrine or otherwise. 
C. The District Court Correctly Entered Summary Judgment Against Mr. Shapley's 
Claims For Bad Faith And Intentional Infliction Of Emotional Distress. 
The district court granted summary judgment against Mr. Shapley's claims for bad faith 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress because they depend on a nonexistent contract to 
insure Mrs. Shapley's life. (R. Vol. 2, p. 283.) Mr. Shapley does not disagree that these claims 
depend on such a contract. And, as just demonstrated, no such contract was made. Accordingly, 
the district court's grant of summary judgment against Mr. Shapley's claims for bad faith and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress must be affirmed. 
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D. The District Court Correctly Entered Summary Judgment Against Mr. Shapley's 
Negligence Claim. 
The district court's initial reason for granting summary judgment against Mr. Shapley's 
negligence claim was that it depends on a nonexistent contract to insure Mrs. Shapley's life. 
(R. Vol. 2, p. 283.) The claim was, in fact, pleaded that way. (R. Vol. 1, p. 17 <J[ 33.) In seeking 
reconsideration, Mr. Shapley argued-for the first time-that his negligence claim does not 
actually depend on such a contract (R. Vol. 2, pp. 318-20, 350-51) but only appeared to do so 
because of inartful pleading. (Tr. p. 54, LL. 13-14.) He then began to argue instead the 
following liability theory: a contract to insure Mrs. Shapley's life would have been made but for 
a negligent failure to advise him and his wife to submit their insurance application in time for the 
underwriting process to be completed before their loan closed, or but for a negligent 
underwriting delay. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 319-20.) 
In opposing reconsideration, Centurion and Wells Fargo contended, muong other things, 
that Mr. Shapley's new theory did not justify reinstating his negligence claim because the 
"economic loss rule" barred it anyway. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 336-38.) Mr. Shapley disagreed, arguing 
on reply that this situation fits within the "special relationship" exception to the economic loss 
rule. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 351-53.) The district court recognized that Mr. Shapley's theory "was never 
argued" before summary judgment was granted. (R. Vol. 2, p. 361.) The district court rejected 
the theory, however, not because it was new, but instead because the economic loss rule bars Mr. 
Shapley's negligence claim anyway. (ld.) Thus, the economic loss rule either supplanted the 
initial ground for summary judgment or became an alternative ground for summary judgment. 
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Nevertheless, Mr. Shapley's opening brief fails to even mention-much less demonstrate 
error in-the district court's application of the economic loss rule to bar his negligence claim. 
Instead, his statement of the issues presented on appeal asks this Court to determine only whether 
it was inappropriate for the district court to grant summary judgment "on the basis that no 
contract of insurance existed." (Appellant'S Opening Br. at 9.) Likewise, his entire opening 
argument is devoted to establishing that the absence of a contract to insure Mrs. Shapley's life 
does not doom his negligence claim. (Id. at 25-27.) 
1. Mr. Shapley waived the right to appellate review of his negligence claim's 
disposition by failing to contest on appeal the district court's alternative 
holding that it is barred by the "economic loss rule." 
Failing to include in his opening brief a challenge to the district court's application of the 
economic loss rule is a mistake Mr. Shapley simply cannot overcome. "This Court has 
consistently held that an appellant's failure to address an independent ground for a grant of 
summary judgment [in his opening brief] is fatal to the appeal." Weisel v. Beaver Springs 
Owners Ass'n, Inc., 152 Idaho 519, 525-26, 272 P.3d 491,497-98 (2012). That holding applies 
here. The question Mr. Shapley presents-whether the district court correctly held that his 
negligence claim fails based on the absence of a contract to insure Mrs. Shapley's life-is 
immaterial in light of his failure to challenge the district court's alternative ground for summary 
judgment: the economic loss rule. Consequently, under Weisel, the disposition of his negligence 
claim is no longer reviewable on appeal. 
Out of caution, however, Centurion and Wells Fargo will proceed to demonstrate that the 
district court correctly applied the economic loss rule to bar Mr. Shapley's negligence claim. 
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2. The economic loss rule bars Mr. Shapley's negligence claim in any event. 
'''The economic loss rule applies to negligence cases in general. '" Brian & Christie, Inc. 
v. Leishman Elec., Inc., 150 Idaho 22, 26, 244 P.3d 166, 170 (2010) (quoting Ramerth v. Hart, 
133 Idaho 194, 197,983 P.2d 848, 851 (1999)). "Unless an exception applies, the economic loss 
rule prohibits recovery of purely economic losses in a negligence action because there is no duty 
to prevent economic loss to another." Id. at 28, 244 P.3d at 172 (italics omitted) (quoting Blahd 
v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 300, 108 P.3d 996, 1000 (2005)). Mr. Shapley seeks to 
recover an economic loss: lost policy benefits. Consequently, that loss is unrecoverable unless 
an exception to the economic loss rule applies. 
The economic loss rule's exceptions are "(1) where a special relationship exists between 
the parties, or (2) where unique circumstances require a reallocation of the risk." Just's, Inc. v. 
Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 470,583 P.2d 997, 1005 (1978); see also Brian & Christie, 
150 Idaho at 28, 244 P.3d at 172 (noting that the economic loss rule also does not bar recovery of 
economic losses that are "parasitic to an injury to person or properiy," which is not the case 
here). This Court, however, has "never applied the [unique circumstances] exception." Blahd, 
141 Idaho at 302, 108 P.3d at 1002. Mr. Shapley did not argue below for applying that 
exception, relying instead solely on the "special relationship" exception. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 351-53.) 
But it also does not apply here, as there was no "special relationship" between the Shapleys and 
either Centurion or Wells Fargo. 
Below, Mr. Shapley built his "special relationship" argument on McAlvain v. General 
Insurance Co. of America, 97 Idaho 777, 780, 554 P.2d 955, 958 (1976), in which this Court 
allowed insureds to bring negligence claims against their insurance agents in light of the advisory 
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relationship between them, despite the economic loss rule, the same way clients can sue lawyers 
and patients can sue doctors for negligence. But neither Centurion nor Wells Fargo was the 
Shapleys' insurance agent, and neither actually had a "special relationship" with the Shapleys. 
In fact, the application papers signed by the Shapleys made clear that "[Wells Fargo] is 
not acting as a broker to you but as an agent for [Centurion]." (R. Vol. 1, p. 115.) By extension, 
the Wells Fargo loan officer who worked with the Shapleys, Steve Ellison, acted as Centurion's 
agent, not the Shapleys' agent. Because neither Wells Fargo itself nor its employee Ellison was 
the Shapleys' agent, Wells Fargo had no "special relationship" with them. Indeed, banks and 
their customers have no "special relationship." Cj, e.g., Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Bliss Valley 
Foods, 121 Idaho 266,278,824 P.2d 841,853 (1991) (holding that "a borrower-lender situation 
does not create a fiduciary relationship"). 
Further, because Ellison acted as Centurion's agent, not the Shapleys' agent, Centurion 
also had no "special relationship" with the Shapleys. Indeed, although McAlvain allows 
negligent-failure-to-procure claims by insureds against their insurance agents, insureds have no 
right to bring similar claims against insurers: 
Although, in certain circumstances, we have recognized a 
duty on the part of an insurance agent to assist a client in obtaining 
adequate insurance, we have done so because the agent performs a 
personal service for his client, in advising him about the kinds and 
extent of desired coverage and in choosing the appropriate 
insurance contract for the insured. Once the application for 
insurance has been submitted to an insurance company for 
underwriting, none of the same special considerations exist. 
Vincent v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 136 Idaho 107, 109-110,29 P.3d 943,945-46 (2001) 
(quotation marks and citation omitted). In fact, the only duty imposed on insurers as a result of 
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any "special relationship" with insureds is "the duty to deal fairly, honestly, and in good faith." 
Rouse, 144 Idaho at 71,156 P.3d at 572. A credit life insurer's rejection of an application is not 
a breach of that duty where, as here, the proposed insureds "were informed they were only 
applying for coverage." Id. 
In sum, this Court should not review the district court's disposition of Mr. Shapley's 
negligence claim, given his failure to challenge the district court's application of the economic 
loss rule as a bar to that claim. Should this Court nevertheless reach that issue, the district 
court's entry of summary judgment should be affirmed because the district court correctly 
applied the economic loss rule. 
E. The District Court Correctly Denied Mr. Shapley's Motion To Amend His 
Complaint To Assert An Estoppel Claim. 
After the district court granted summary judgment, Mr. Shapley filed a motion to amend 
his complaint to add a claim for estoppel. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 285-301.) He relied on an estoppel 
doctrine that is specific to the context of insurance contracts, under which an insurer is estopped 
to deny that the insurance contract contains coverage as promised by the insurer's agent in 
inducing the insured's insurance purchase, provided that the insured reasonably relied on the 
agent's promise and the insurer profited by not adhering to it. See, e.g., Shoup v. Union Sec. Life 
Ins. Co., 142 Idaho 152, 155, 124 P.3d 1028, 1031 (2005); Young v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 127 Idaho 122, 126,898 P.2d 53,57 (1995). Mr. Shapley argued for the application of that 
estoppel doctrine by citing alleged representations (both on the insurance application itself and 
by Ellison after Mrs. Shapley's death) that insurance on her life had taken effect immediately 
upon the Shapleys' application for it. (R. Vol. 2, p. 288.) 
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Centurion and Wells Fargo opposed the motion on the ground that the proposed estoppel 
claim is futile. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 323-30.) Futility is, of course, a well-recognized basis for denying 
a proposed amendment. E.g., Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 847,243 P.3d 642,663 
(2010) (affirming the district court's denial of leave to amend because the proposed claims could 
not have withstood a motion to dismiss and therefore were futile). As Centurion and Wells 
Fargo argued to the district court, Centurion never issued insurance on Mrs. Shapley's life at all, 
so there was no insurance contract to modify, through the estoppel doctrine at issue, so as to 
reflect any alleged pre-contractual promises to the Shapleys. (R. Vol. 2, p. 327.) The district 
court agreed that the absence of a contract to insure Mrs. Shapley's life renders the estoppel 
doctrine inapplicable, and leave to amend was denied on that basis. (R. Vol. 2, p. 358.) The 
district court correctly held that the proposed estoppel claim is futile. 
Indeed, its futility is underscored by the nature and timing of the two supposed 
representations on which it depends. The first alleged representation is the application's 
recitation that July 10, 2008-the date of the application-was the "Proposed Effective Date of 
Insurance." (R. Vol. 1, pp. 110, 114.) That recitation is in no way, shape, or form a promise or 
representation that insurance on Mrs. Shapley's life automatically took effect upon application. 
The Shapleys could not reasonably have viewed it that way, given that in at least five different 
places the application papers informed the Shapleys that insurance would be issued only if 
Centurion approved the application. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 110, 112, 114, 115; R. Vol. 2, p, 211.) The 
second alleged representation also fails the "reasonable reliance" test, but for a different reason. 
It is Ellison's alleged statement to Mr. Shapley, after Mrs. Shapley had passed away, that 
insurance on her life had taken effect immediately upon application. The Shapleys could not 
- 21 -
03893,0265,5327612,2 
have relied on that alleged, after-the-fact statement in applying for insurance from Centurion. 
Without reasonable reliance, the estoppel doctrine on which Mr. Shapley relies is not satisfied. 
See, e.g., Shoup, 142 Idaho at 155,124 P.3d at 103l. 
Perhaps cognizant of the futility of the estoppel theory he presented to the district court, 
Mr. Shapley offers a second estoppel theory on appeal: quasi-estoppeL (Appellant's Opening 
Br. at 24-25.) Mr. Shapley never sought the district court's permission to assert a quasi-estoppel 
claim. Before the district court, he raised only the insurance-specific estoppel doctrine just 
discussed. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 285-301, 341-45; Tr. pp. 28, LL. 5-21; Tr. p. 44, L. 11 - p. 47, L. 9.) 
"This Court will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeaL" Clear Springs Foods, 
Inc. v. Spackman, 150 Idaho 790,812,252 P.3d 71,93 (2011); see also Myers v. City of 
Pocatello, 98 Idaho 168, 170,559 P.2d 1136, 1138 (1977) ("This court has long held that a 
failure to move to amend a complaint in the lower court forecloses a plaintiff from raising the 
issue on appeal."). Mr. Shapley's new quasi-estoppel theory therefore should not be considered. 
That said, it is not a viable theory anyway. "To prevail on a quasi-estoppel theory, the 
claimant must show: '(1) the offending party took a different position than his or her original 
position, and (2) either (a) the offending party gained an advantage or caused a disadvantage to 
the other party; (b) the other party was induced to change positions; or (c) it would be 
unconscionable to permit the offending party to maintain an inconsistent position from one he or 
she has already derived a benefit or acquiesced in.'" Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 149 
Idaho 437, 443, 235 P.3d 387,393 (2010) (quoting Terrazas v. Blaine County, 147 Idaho 193, 
200 n. 3, 207 P.3d 169, 176 n. 3 (2009». The supposed change in positions is not identified in 
the quasi-estoppel subsection of Mr. Shapley's opening brief. He might be relying on the notion 
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that Centurion or Wells Fargo changed positions as to whether insurance was issued on Mrs. 
Shapley's life, in that Ellison supposedly told Mr. Shapley after his wife died that insurance on 
Mrs. Shapley's life went into effect immediately upon application, but Centurion later denied 
having issued insurance on her life. (Appellant's Opening Br. at 24.) In that scenario, however, 
both the initial position and the changed position were taken after Mrs. Shapley had died. 
Centurion and Wells Fargo gained no advantage by (supposedly) first telling Mr. Shapley his 
wife's death was a covered event and then telling him otherwise. Similarly, Mr. Shapley 
suffered no disadvantage from first (supposedly) being told his wife's death was a covered event 
and then learning otherwise, nor did he change his own position in some way as a result of what 
he says Ellison told him. Finally, neither Centurion nor Wells Fargo derived a benefit from 
Ellison's supposed statement. That statement, if made, was nothing more than an error. It does 
not change the reality that Mrs. Shapley died before Centurion had the opportunity to decide 
whether to issue insurance on her life. 
For these reasons, the district court correctly denied Mr. Shapley permission to amend his 
complaint to assert an estoppel claim. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Al though tragic, Mrs. Shapley's death does not alter the basic rights of the parties to 
come to an agreement on the issuance of a policy of insurance. Mrs. Shapley's untimely death 
prevented the parties from completing the contractually agreed-upon conditions precedent to the 
issuance of an insurance contract. No contract to insure Mrs. Shapley's life was ever made. 
Accordingly, the district court's grant of summary judgment should be affirmed. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 9th day of October, 2012. 
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BYl~ 
Kenneth C. Howell, ISB No. 3235 
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